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Many financial institutions employ outside portfolio managers to manage part or 
all of their investable assets.  These institutions include pension funds, private 
endowments (e.g., colleges and charities), and private trusts.  In 1999, the investment 
company institute estimated that these institutions managed 5.2 trillion dollars in assets. 
Most of these institutions employed outside managers to invest these funds.  The 
relevancy of this problem has been widely recognized in the practitioners literature on 
portfolio?1  Furthermore, it is recognized in the prudent man law that spells out the 
responsibilities of the centralized decision maker delegating management responsibility.2  
For example the New York State law in estate power and trust states.  Pension funds are 
the largest and most likely organizations to employ several outside managers, each of 
whom manages a part of the overall portfolio.  In this paper we will use the pension fund 
manager as the prototype of the centralized decision-maker trying to optimally manage a 
set of decentralized portfolio managers but the analysts is general. 
 If the centralized decision-maker (CDM) is a mean variance maximizer, the CDM 
could construct a portfolio using standard portfolio theory and estimates of mean return, 
variances, and covariances between the portfolios constructed by a group of decentralized 
managers.  However, this overall portfolio is unlikely to be optimum since the 
individually managed portfolios themselves were constructed without taking into account 
the portfolios of the other managers.  The purpose of this article is to set up a structure 
that leads to the optimum portfolio from the viewpoint of the CDM when there are 
multiple managers and their portfolios are constructed without reference to each other. 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Di Bartolomer (1999), Grinald and Kahn (1995), Farrell (1976), and Rosenberry (1977). 
2 For a full discussion of modern portfolio theory and the prudent man rule see Elton and Gruber in 
Longstaff ( ). 
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 This paper can be viewed as a contribution to the extensive literature in Financial 
Economics developing conditions under which a CDM will never make a worse decision 
than decentralized managers providing the information is used optimally.3  This literature 
assumes the decentralized managers are willing to provide all information to each other 
or to a centralized manager.  This case has been examined for the pension fund problem 
by Rosenberg (1977) and D. Bartolomeo (1999).  For example, Rosenberg (1977) 
demonstrated that with full information, the decentralized portfolio managers will not 
make better decisions than that of the centralized manager.  This paper examines a 
special case of this more general literature: the case of a centralized portfolio manager 
employing a set of individual portfolio managers each of whom constructs his or her own 
portfolio without communicating with other managers.  Several authors have asserted that 
this problem is too difficult to solve (see Rosenberg (1977) and D. Bartolomeo (1999)).  
They argue the only solutions are for each outside manager to either turn over all of their 
estimates for individual security characteristics to a centralized manager or to supply all 
purchases and sales to the centralized managers.  In the latter case models are presented 
that allow the central manager to approximate from this information, the individual 
managers’ forecasts. What makes this a special case is the realistic assumption that a 
decentralized manager is only willing to share some information with the centralized 
manager and none with other managers.  In this article, we solve for sets of conditions 
under which the centralized manager can make optimum decisions despite partial 
information through the use of guidelines for the decentralized managers.  While this can 
be viewed as an extension of the previous literature on centralized versus decentralized 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Radner (1962), Marshak and Radner (1972), and Ohlson (1975 and 1979). 
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decision making it is of at least equal importance because it offers a solution to a problem 
which is at the heart of investment allocation today. 
 In the first section we will present a more detailed discussion of the problem.  We 
will then solve the problem for one active manager and multiple passive portfolios.  The 
model is then generalized to multiple active managers.  Next, we present solutions under 
a simplified structure of the return-generating process.  Finally, we discuss the 
complications when short sales are not allowed.   
I. Background 
In this section we discuss some background material on the pension investment 
problem and review the relevant literature.  The same considerations hold for private 
endowments and trusts.  Most pension plans are managed by a centralized decision maker 
at a firm.  Most firms have one person who is principally in charge, although the ultimate 
responsibility rests with a committee, usually the board.  This CDM normally employs 
outside portfolio managers to construct active portfolios.  Index funds are generic 
products and we will assume the centralized decision maker can potentially select one or 
more of these.  The centralized decision maker’s task is fourfold: 1) decide how much to 
invest in each portfolio, 2) give the outside managers instructions that will result in their 
making optimum security allocations from the point of view of the overall plan, 3) design 
incentive systems so that the managers will behave optimally4, and 4) evaluate and select 
the portfolio managers.  In this paper we deal only with the first two of these problems 
although our solutions have major implications for the third and fourth problems.  
Throughout the paper, we assume that the portfolio managers will not provide the 
                                                 
4 No one has addressed the multi-period incentive problem outlined here.  However, there are a number of 
related articles.  See for example, Dyvig, Farnsworth and Carpenter (2001), Kihlstrom (1988), Stoughton 
(1993), and Zender (1988). 
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centralized decision maker with their return forecasts for individual securities, but will 
provide aggregate information about the portfolios they hold. 
 Aspects of this problem have previously been addressed by Treynor and Black 
(1973) and  in more detail by Sharpe (1981).  The Treynor Black article discussed the 
active passive split when the CAPM described the returns on the passive portfolio, short 
sales are allowed and the single-index model describes the return generating process.  
The clear antecedent to this article is Sharpe’s (1981) Presidential address. Sharpe 
develops, with one active and one passive manager, the instructions for the active 
manager that will result in the active manager producing a globally optimal portfolio for a 
particular utility function.  He assumes short sales are allowed and the variance 
covariance matrix is agreed on by all parties.  He also solves for the instructions to be 
given to the managers that results in a global optimal for the case of two managers 
following exactly the same set of securities where the centralized decision maker believes 
the best forecast of a securities alpha is a weighted average of the two managers alphas 
and where these weights add to one.  In solving this problem he maintains the assumption 
of short sales allowed and agreement on the variance covariance matrix.  Sharpe could 
not obtain an exact solution for the case of managers following non-overlapping 
securities.  Our analysis extends Sharpe in that we generalize to N managers, have no 
requirement that each manager holds the same securities, and, by employing a multi-
factor model, can arrive at simple rules for forming myopic optimum portfolios, 
understanding the weight placed on each security in these portfolios, and the amount to 
allocate to each active and passive portfolio.  We also extend the analysis to the case 
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where short sales are not allowed and show conditions under which optimal decentralized 
management is possible and when it is not. 
II. Separation with a single active and multiple passive managers 
In this section of the paper we will assume that a centralized decision maker (CDM) 
exists who hires a single active manager.  We will shortly expand the case to several 
active managers.  We will assume the following: 1) the CDM is a mean variance decision 
maker, 2) the CDM believes a multi-index model describes the return structure for 
securities and all indexes in the multi-index model are tradable. 
The second point requires some clarification.  The CDM believes that returns can be 
described as being generated by a set of indexes (not necessarily orthogonal) that the 
CDM can take positions in as passive portfolios5.  For example, this is consistent with a 
belief that the return on securities is a function of the market return, the return on a 
portfolio of small stocks, and/or the return on a portfolio of value or growth stocks.  The 
CDM wishes to consider these sources of risk in making the optimum mean variance 
decision.  For expositional reasons we will analyze the CDM’s problem with a two index 
model though the solution easily generalizes to any number of indexes. 
 
A. The CDM’s problem 
 We start by examining the optimum decision the CDM would make if the CDM 
had all the information that is available to the active managers.  As mentioned earlier, we 
believe the CDM would not be able to obtain risk adjusted return forecasts for individual 
securities from the active manager, but for the moment we examine the optimum decision 
                                                 
5 Index funds, many of them exchange traded, exist for almost any index a manager might want to use in a 
return generating process. 
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as if the CDM has such information.  We will also assume that the CDM does not have 
perfect faith in the return forecasts of the active manager.  This implies that the CDM will 
take positions in the passive portfolios for two reasons, to obtain diversification across 
securities so that the aggregate portfolio is mean variance efficient, and to eliminate some 
of the lack of reliability in the analyst’s estimates. 
 In order to specify the return generating process, define 
1. iR  is the return on stock i 
2. FR  is the risk free rate of interest 
3. BA RR  ,  is the return on index A and index B respectively 
4. iBiA ββ  ,  is the sensitivity of stock i to indexes A and B 
5. 22  , BA σσ  is the variance of the return on indexes A and B 
6. 2eiσ  is the residual risk of stock i from the two-index model 
7. iα  is the risk adjusted return on security i 
8. ie  is the residual return for security i 
9. The superscript D designates that the decision is from the point of view of the 
CDM. 
Then the return generating process is 
( ) ( ) iFBiBFAiAiFi eRRRRRR +−+−+=− ββα    (1) 
Assume that the CDM had access to the excess return forecasts )( iα of the active 
manager.  Furthermore, assume the CDM believes that the best estimate of risk-adjusted 
excess return is an average of the analysts’ forecasts and the value that would occur in 
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equilibrium namely zero.  Thus, we define the excess risk adjusted return that the CDM 
would use as i
D
i Wαα = where W is set by the CDM between 0 and 1
6. 
 To solve this problem, assuming short sales, the CDM can use the standard first 
order conditions.  The investments that can be selected are the N individual securities and 
the two indexes.  The first order condition for security and index i is 
ij
D
j
N
ij
ji
D
iFi ZZRR σσ
2
1
2
+
≠
=
Σ+=−  for i=1,…,N+2    (2) 
Where 
1. N is the number of securities entering into the decision making process 
2. Security N+1 and N+2 are indexes which we henceforth designate as A and B. 
3. DiZ  is a number proportional to the optimal weight which the CDM would place 
in security i 
If the return generating process described in equation (1) is an accurate 
description of returns and we recognize that the indexes need not be orthogonal, then we 
can define the variance and covariance between individual securities as 
222222 2 eiABiBiABiBAiAi σσββσβσβσ +++=    for i=1,…,N 
ABjAiBABjBiABjBiBAjAiAij σββσββσββσββσ +++= 22  for i=1…N j=1,…N 
        ji ≠  
                                                 
6 While the optimum way to set W is beyond the scope of this paper, there have been a number of excellent 
articles published in the past few years explaining optimum ways of changing alpha for estimation risk and 
bias.  See Bawa, Brown, and Kleen (1979) for the fundamental application of Baysian analysis and Baks, 
Metrick, and Wachter (2001) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2001) for recent applications of Baysian analysis 
to estimating the inputs for optimal portfolio allocation.  
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For the N+1 and N+2 securities (the indexes), a simpler form exists.  For example, for 
index A the variance is 2Aσ  and the covariance with index B is ABσ  and the covariance 
with individual securities is 
ABiBAiAiA σβσβσ += 2  
Employing these relationships with the first order condition (2), we get for security i 
=−+−+ )()( FBiBFAiAi RRRRW ββα  
++++ 22222 2 ei
D
iABiBiA
D
iBiB
D
iAiA
D
i ZZZZ σσββσβσβ  
+Σ+Σ+Σ
≠
=
≠
=
≠
=
ABjB
D
j
ij
jiABjB
D
j
N
ij
jiBAjA
D
j
N
ij
jiA
ZZZ σββσββσββ
1
2
1
2
1
   (3) 
ABiA
D
BBiB
D
BABiB
D
AAiA
D
AABjA
D
j
N
ij
jiB
ZZZZZ σβσβσβσβσββ ++++Σ
≠
=
22
1
 
and for the indexes 
AB
D
BABjB
D
j
N
jAjA
D
j
N
jA
D
AFA ZZZZRR σσβσβσ +Σ+Σ+=−
== 1
2
1
2    (4) 
AB
D
AABjA
D
j
N
jBjB
D
j
N
jB
D
BFB ZZZZRR σσβσβσ +Σ+Σ+=−
== 1
2
1
2    (5) 
Substituting equations (4) and (5) into equation (3) and simplifying, we get7 
22
ei
i
ei
D
iD
i
WZ
σ
α
σ
α
==         (6) 
To solve for the optimum amount in security i we consider the active portfolio denoted 
by P as a separate portfolio and look at the optimum composition of this portfolio before 
we allocate across all three portfolios.  We can treat the design of P as a separate 
portfolio because from equation (6), DiZ  is not a function of AZ  or BZ . 
                                                 
7 A similar expression but in a different context can be found in Elton and Gruber and Padberg (1979). 
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 The fraction to invest in any stock, ipX , in the active portfolio can be determined 
by recognizing that8 D
i
D
i
ip Z
ZX
Σ
= .  Therefore, recognizing that the amount to invest in an 
stock i in the optimal active portfolio from the viewpoint of the CDM is  
ej
tjN
j
ei
i
ej
D
j
N
j
ei
D
i
ipX
σ
α
σ
α
σ
α
σ
α
1
2
2
1
2
  
==
Σ
=
Σ
=         (7) 
Once portfolio P is determined simple procedures exist for allocating funds between the 
active and passive portfolios.  These are presented in Section C below. 
B. Optimum active portfolio 
The CDM can ensure that the active manager will hold the optimal active 
portfolio from the point of view of the CDM simply by instructing the active manager to 
compute by 2
ei
i
σ
α  for each stock and to hold them in that proportion.9  This simple 
instruction ensures that the active manager will turn over to the CDM the same active 
portfolio that the CDM would hold if all the security estimates were supplied directly to 
the CDM.  Optimization for the active portfolio is reached without the active manager 
giving up private information. 
Of course the CDM still has the problem of deciding what fraction of funds to 
place in the active portfolio and each of the passive portfolios. 
                                                 
8 See Elton, Gruber, and Padburg (1976) for a full exposition or Lintner (1965) for the original proof. 
9. If the decentralized manager were simply told to form the optimum active portfolio assuming that he 
could hold the passive portfolio, he would get the same result as following the direction from the central 
manager.  Although this ranking device was derived in the prior section using two indexes it is easy to 
show that the same ranking devise holds if there are N indexes 
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C. Solving the aggregate allocation problem 
Denote the characteristics of the active portfolio by the subscript P.  Then from 
the viewpoint of the CDM, ignoring for the moment any difficulty of getting information, 
the problem can be formulated and solved using the following first order conditions10. 
=−+−+ )()( FBPBFAPA
D
P RRRR ββα  
2222222 )2( BPB
D
BAPA
D
AePABPBPABPBAPA
D
P ZZZ σβσβσσββσβσβ +++++  
AB
D
BA
D
AABPBAPA
D
PFA ZZZRR σσσβσβ +++=− 22 )(  
AB
D
AB
D
BABPABPB
D
PFB ZZZRR σσσβσβ +++=− 22 )(  
 These are standard first order conditions.  Since everything but the Z’s are known, 
the equations can be solved explicitly for the optimal fraction of funds in each portfolio.  
To do this we utilize a relationship we derive later. As shown in equation (13), 
22
eP
P
ej
j
σ
α
σ
α
=Σ .  Using this expression, the solution is 
( )
( )
( )
( ) 2222 11 eP
P
PA
BA
FB
A
FAD
A W
RRRRZ
σ
αβ
ρσσ
ρ
ρσ
−
−
−
−
−
−
=  
( )
( )
( ) 2222 11 eP
P
PB
BA
FA
B
FB
B W
RRRRZ
σ
αβ
ρσσρσ
−
−
−
−
−
−
=      (8) 
2
eP
P
P WZ σ
α
=  
Where ρ is the correlation between passive portfolio A and B.  These three equations 
along with the expression normalizing the portfolio weights to add to one which is  
                                                 
10 The extension to more than two indexes is straightforward.  One new equation would be added for each 
index, one Z for each new index would be added to each equation and the variance and covariance terms 
would be modified to account for the additional indexes. 
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ll
k
k Z
Z
X
Σ
=      PBAl  and ,,=    
 
give us the closed form solution for the optimal weight to place in the active and each 
passive portfolio.   
 The optimal weights depend on the fundamental characteristics of each of the 
three portfolios in a way that makes intuitive sense.  For each of the passive index funds, 
the higher the excess return on the fund relative to its variance, the larger the allocation of 
funds to that portfolio.  Similarly, for the active portfolio, the larger the risk adjusted 
return for that portfolio relative to its unsystematic risk, the greater the funds placed in it.  
The correlation coefficient between the indexes also has a large effect on the relative 
investment in each of the passive portfolios.  The impact of the correlation coefficient on 
allocation depends on the ratio of the excess return to standard deviation of index A to 
that of index B as well as the size of the correlation coefficient itself.  In order to 
determine the split across portfolios, the CDM needs to request the active manager’s 
estimate of the alpha for the active portfolio, the residual risk of the active portfolio and 
the active portfolio sensitivities to the two indexes.  These are the types of estimates the 
active manager should be willing to supply since they are aggregate portfolio values 
rather than individual security values.11  The CDM needs to estimate the expected return 
above the riskless rate and risk on the passive funds, the covariance between the passive 
                                                 
11 As stated earlier, we are assuming that the CDM and the active manager are employing identical 
estimates of the β ’s and residual risks but not return characteristics of each security.  This could come 
about naturally if the risk parameters were estimated from the same commercial service (e.g., BARA or 
Wilshire).  The CDM could either specify that decentralized managers use a particular commercial service 
or directly supply the risk parameters for the assumption of our model to hold.  The need for a common 
return generating process might particularly explain the specification of benchmarks in contracts with 
managers. 
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funds, and the amount of weight (W) to put on the active manager’s estimates.  If futures 
are available on the indexes, the aggregate portfolio problem is simplified.  
D. The Aggregate Portfolio Problem with Futures 
If futures are available on the indexes, then sensitivities to the indexes can be 
adjusted without affecting the amount invested in the active portfolio.  The expected 
return and risk on the portfolio of the CDM is, 
 ( ) ( )FBBFAAPPFC RRRRWXRR −+−+=− ββα  
 ABBABBAAePPC X σββσβσβσσ 2222222 +++=  
where C is the overall portfolio held by the CDM.  The choice variables for the CDM are 
how much to put in the active portfolio, how much to place in the riskless asset and the 
level of sensitivity of the overall portfolio to each of the factors.  Taking derivatives of 
C
FC RR
σ
θ −= with respect to BAPX ββ  and  ,  respectively results in the following first 
order conditions 
 
 222
eP
P
eP
D
P
P
C
FC WXRR
σ
α
σ
σ
σ
==
−
 
 
 ( ) FAABBAA
C
FC RRRR −=+− σβσβ
σ
222  
 ( ) FBABABB
C
FC RRRR −=+− σβσβ
σ
222 . 
The efficient frontier is the line connecting the riskless asset with the optimal risky 
portfolio.  If we can determine one point on the line, we can trace out the full efficient 
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frontier.  Varying PX  traces out the line.  Thus, with no loss of generality we can solve 
for the portfolio with 1=PX .  Setting PX  equal to one we get that the optimum betas 
are 
 
( ) ( )
( )2
2
2
1 AB
P
eP
AB
BA
FB
A
FA
A
W
RRRR
ρ
α
σρ
σσσβ
−





 −
−
−
=  
 
( )
( )2
2
2
1 AB
P
eP
AB
BA
FA
B
FB
B
W
RRRR
ρ
α
σρ
σσσβ
−





 −
−
−
=  
 
where ABρ  is the correlation between the two indexes. 
 The easiest way to interpret the results is to consider the case ABρ  equal to zero.  
With this assumption, Aβ  is equal to the excess return to risk of index A divided by the 
ratio of the risk adjusted return to the residual risk of the active portfolio.  When the 
indexes are correlated, this ratio is modified to take account the correlation between the 
indexes.  
 We have now presented a set of conditions under which a centralized decision-
maker can optimize portfolio composition while employing one active manager.  The 
next problem to solve is the case where the CDM employs several active managers. 
III. Multiple active managers 
The analysis generalizes to multiple active managers whether these managers follow 
some or all securities in common or follow independent sections of the market.12  For 
                                                 
12 Sharpe (1981) did not reach an explicit solution in the case where only some securities were in common 
across active managers. 
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simplicity we will solve for the case of two active managers, but the analysis easily 
generalizes.  Assume that the CDM has all the information produced by each manager 
but different confidence in the forecasts of each manager.  Furthermore, the CDM 
believes that all the managers α  estimates are too extreme but that the appropriate 
estimate is some combination of them.13  If we designate the weight the CDM puts on the 
estimate prepared by manager 1 as 1W  and manager 2 as 2W .  Then 2211 ii
D
i WW ααα += .  
Once again it is necessary for the CDM to supply estimates of betas and residual 
variances to all active managers either directly or by specifying that they use a common 
service such as BARRA.  Since 2eiσ  is supplied by the CDM to all managers, it is 
common and 
2
2
22
1
12
ei
i
ei
i
ei
D
i WW
σ
α
σ
α
σ
α
+=         (9) 
 Earlier we showed that 2
ei
D
i
α
α
was proportioned to the optimum amount that the 
CDM wished to place in security i if all alphas were supplied to the CDM.  The issue we 
address in this section is the instructions to give to the individual managers and the 
correct proportions to invest in each active portfolio so that the CDM, by combining the 
portfolios of the active managers, ends up with a fraction in the active portfolio 
proportional to 2
ei
D
i
σ
α  for each security i. 
 Summing both sides of equation (9) across all securities 
                                                 
13 Implicit in what follows is if only one manager follows a security, the CDM assumes the best estimate of 
the second manager’s alpha if he/she followed it would be zero. 
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2
2
22
1
12
ei
iW
ei
iW
ei
D
i
iii σ
α
σ
α
σ
α
Σ+Σ=Σ       (10) 
If the CDM instructs each manager to compute 2
ei
i
σ
α  for each security and to place a 
fraction of money in each security proportional to this ratio we can define the fraction 
any manager (e.g., manager 1) places in any security as 
2
1
1
1
2
1
ej
jN
j
i
X eii
σ
α
σ
α
=
Σ
= . 
 We will now show this instruction results in an overall optimum.  However, 
before we do so, we need to derive some of the attributes of the portfolio which manager 
1 (or any manager) will hold.  The risk-adjusted excess return on the portfolio held by 
manager 1 is 
2
1
2
2
1
2
1
12
1
111
ej
j
j
ej
j
j
ej
j
j
ej
j
jjXjP
j
j
σ
α
σ
α
σ
α
α
σ
α
αα
Σ




















Σ
=
Σ




















Σ
=Σ=     (11) 
and the residual risk of this active portfolio is 
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2
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2
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2
2
2
1
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
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
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
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

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






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

Σ
=
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
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

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


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

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
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




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












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Σ
=Σ=
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j
j
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j
j
ej
j
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j
ejjXjeP
j
j
σ
α
σ
α
σ
α
σ
σ
α
σσ    (12) 
Taking the ratio of (11) and (12) yields 
2
1
2
1
1
ej
j
eP
P
j σ
α
σ
α
Σ=         (13) 
Furthermore, KP1β where the subscript K is a counter, indication either index A or index B 
equals 
2
2
1
11
ej
j
jK
ej
j
jkjXj
j
j
KP
σ
α
β
σ
α
ββ
Σ










Σ
=Σ=      (14) 
Rearranging and substituting equation (13) yields 
2
1
2
1
1
eP
P
ej
jKj
KPj σ
αβ
σ
βα
=Σ        (15) 
Having developed these expressions, we can now show that there exists an allocation 
across the active portfolios along with the instruction to the individual managers to hold 
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stocks in proportion 2
ei
i
σ
α
, which results in an overall optimum to the CDM.  
Substituting equation (13) into (10) yields 
2
2
2
22
1
1
12
eP
PW
eP
PW
ePD
D
P
σ
α
σ
α
σ
α
+=      (16) 
 Recall that the individual portfolio manager has been instructed to form a 
portfolio by holding securities proportional to the ratio of excess return to residual risk.  
Recognizing this instruction and using equation (13) to simplify the denominator 
2
1
1
2
1
1
eP
P
ei
i
iX
σ
α
σ
α
=        (17) 
Dividing both sides of equation (9) by 
2
ePD
D
P
σ
α
, the correct amount in security i in the 
active portfolios from the point of view of the CDM is 























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Where the terms in brackets represent the proportion of the active portfolio to invest with 
manager 1 and manager 2, respectively.  Since
2
ePD
D
P
σ
α
 can be computed from equation 
(16), if the CDM obtains 1Pα  and 
2
1ePσ from manager 1, and 2Pα and 
2
2ePσ  from 
manager 2, he or she can determine optimum proportions among active managers.   
 In addition, since the CDM knows the characteristics of the aggregate active 
portfolio, the CDM can act in determining the split between the active and passive 
portfolios as if there is a single portfolio.  Thus, the allocation between the active 
portfolio and the two passive portfolios can be determined using the equations in Section 
II C. 
IV. Orthogonal Indexes 
Up to this point we have assumed that the indexes are not orthogonal.  The 
advantage of this is that it allows the passive portfolios to be portfolios that exist in the 
market such as small stocks, the S&P Index, growth stocks, etc.  However, if we are 
willing to assume orthogonal indexes the allocation across active and passive managers is 
simplified.  With orthogonal indexes, the covariance among indexes is zero, and there 
exists a simple formula for the amount to invest in the passive index.  For passive index 
A equation (4) becomes 
22
A
D
AAjA
D
jjFA ZZRR σσβ +Σ=−  
Solving for DAZ  
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Substituting for DjZ  from equation (6) yields 
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−
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Expressing 
2
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D
j
σ
α
 in terms of the two active portfolios 
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Finally, using equation (15): 
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Thus, the centralized decision maker can determine the total Z and the split between each 
of the passive portfolios and each of the active portfolios using a simple formula if all 
managers provide their estimates of βσα  and 2 , ePP  on each index, and the centralized 
decision maker estimates the W’s and excess return and risk on the index.  The active 
managers also need to have common risk measures, iβ ’s and 2eiσ  for all securities under 
consideration.  In the case of orthogonal indexes, characteristics of indexes other than the 
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one being analyzed do not impact the Z associated with any index.  Thus, the equation 
applies to any number of indexes14. 
IV. Short sales not allowed 
Let’s start with the case of a single active manager where short sales of the 
indexes are allowed but short sales of securities are not.  This case is realistic for some 
centralized decision makers.  Futures exchange traded funds or future replications with 
options exist for many indexes.  In this case a CDM can effectively short sell indexes.  To 
determine the optimum when securities cannot be short sold, we need to use Kuhn, 
Tucker conditions.  This simply involves adding the dual variables iM ’s (one for each 
security) to equation (3) the first order conditions for each security when short sales are 
allowed.  The solution to the portfolio problem makes use of the complimentary 
conditions that the product of the dual and the primal must be zero ( )iMX ii  allfor  0=  
and that ii XM  and  must be equal to or greater than zero for all i.  Since there are no 
duals on the first order conditions for indexes, equations (4) and (5) are unchanged.  
Equation (6) holds with the addition of the dual for the security15.  Adding the dual, 
equation (6) becomes *2 i
ei
iD
i M
W
Z +=
σ
α
. 
If iα  is positive, 
D
iZ  must be positive since 
*
iM cannot be negative.  If 
D
iZ  is 
positive from the complementary correlation, *iM  must be zero.  If iα  is negative then 
*
iM must be positive so that 
D
iZ  is not negative and from the complementary condition 
                                                 
 
15 *iM  is a transformation of the iM added to each equation, but has the same sign as iM . 
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D
iZ  must be zero.  Thus, all 
D
iZ  either equal 2
ei
iW
σ
α
 or zero.  The optimum portfolio for 
the CDM is obtained by having the manager invest in all securities for which 0>iα  and 
as before in proportion to 2
ei
i
σ
α
.  The equations in section II C, then define the optimal 
split between the active and passive portfolios. 
If there are multiple active managers, the condition under which an optimal 
solution can be reached are more restrictive.  To understand the problem, consider the 
case where manager 1 forecasts 01 >iα  and manager 2 forecasts 02 <iα  where the 
absolute value of 2iα  is greater than 1iα  and the CDM puts equal weights on the 
estimates of each manager.  In this case the CDM would want to hold zero in security i.  
However, manager 1 will hold positive proportions and without short sales, manager 2 
will hold zero rather than short sell.  No combination will provide an optimum to the 
CDM. 
The only exception to this scenario is the case where the centralized manager 
wishes to place no weight on a forecast of a negative alpha.  This implies that the CDM 
believes the managers have no ability to forecast below normal returns but have some 
ability on the upside.  In the case where 01 >iα  and 02 <iα , the CDM would want to 
use 11 iW
D
i αα =  and, providing all passive portfolios are held long or short sales of 
passive portfolios are allowed, the analysis outlined above goes through with each active 
manager not allowed to have short sales. 
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V. Conclusion 
In this article we have shown that under realistic conditions when short sales are 
allowed, it is possible, and indeed quite easy, for a centralized decision maker to form an 
optimal overall portfolio while employing multiple outside portfolio managers16.  This is 
on contrast to the assertions in the practitioner literature that argue this is not possible or 
possible only with full information.  Outside managers should be willing to supply the 
information the CDM needs in our models since it does not require them to reveal private 
information on individual securities.  Managers should be hesitant to reveal information 
on individual securities, since it is useful for multiple portfolios and to reveal it opens up 
the possibility of resale or direct use of the information. 
When short sales are not allowed and if there is a single active manager to 
combine with passive indexes, a solution exists if it is optimum for the manager to place 
some funds in each index and/or the indexes (as opposed to the securities) can be sold 
short17.  When short sales are not allowed and there are multiple active managers, the 
previous analysis holds as long as a forecast of a negative alpha by a manager is taken to 
convey no information and the manager is simply told not to hold securities with negative 
alpha. 
We have shown that in the case of multiple managers, if short sales are not 
allowed and the centralized manager makes use of estimates of negative alphas as well as 
positive alphas, a general optimum solution does not exist. 
 
                                                 
16 Allowing short sales is an increasingly realistic case with the ability to use futures to short and with funds 
like hedge funds routinely shorting. 
17 The assumption that indexes can be sold short becomes increasingly realistic over time as exchange 
traded funds and futures have been created for an increasing number of indexes.  It can be shown if the 
indexes cannot be sold short, a solution still exists as long as one and only one index is not held long 
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